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Upon Information and Belief
The plan for legal internships, which has been used so successfully
in Pennsylvania, is apparently receiving serious consideration by the
legal profession throughout the United States. The latest state associa-
tion giving consideration to the proposal is the Minnesota Bar Associa-
tion, which has under advisement such a program for that state. The
plan contemplates that law students or recent law graduates shall serve
an apprenticeship with established law firms or law offices in order that
the newly admitted lawyer familiarize himself with the practical aspects
and procedure of court and office work.
The revival of interest in this proposal comes at an apt time when
standards throughout the country are generally being lowered in favor
of law students who are serving in the armed forces. The need for the
adoption of such a plan becomes more apparent in cases of those men
who are admitted to the profession without examination and, prob-
ably, in most cases, after some absence from their law school work.
It suggests an opportunity for bar associations to aid the legal
profession, insuring high standards and better quality work, and to pro-
tect the public against those who may be not fully qualified to practice.
Calendar
A pril 6 -----------------------------------------..... -- -- M eeting of D enver Bar A ssociation
M ay 9 ......................... ............ ....................-- ---------------- L aw D ay at B o ulder
May 23 .................. Institute at Monte Vista
August 17 -------------- Meeting of the Committee on Uniform State Laws at Detroit
August 24 Meeting of the American Bar Association at Detroit
September 18-19 (tentative) ------------- Meeting of the Colorado Bar Association
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We Want Dicta!
Yes, we really do. Your editors and your president have decided
that your editors should have a complete set of DICTA. The point
is that we don't want to publish something which we published last
year. And so we have been trying, lo, these many months, to get to-
gether a full set. We have almost succeeded, but we need a few more
copies. To be specific, we need Numbers 4 and 7 to 12 inclusive, of
Volume 13; Number 13 of Volume 14, and Number 10 of Volume 15.
Mrs. Bouck very thoughtfully collected together the old issues
which Chief Justice Bouck had saved and gave them to us. That was
a great help, but we still need the numbers named above. So won't you
look through your bookshelves, and if you have the missing numbers
and will donate them to us, we will inscribe your name in the immortal
pages of DICTA so that posterity may know of your kind and generous
act.
Law Day at Boulder
The Law Day at Boulder has been set for Saturday, May 9. In
past years the University has held a Law Day, an Engineering Day,
a Business School Day, and so on, each being held at a different time.
This year all will be held on May 8 and 9 under the name of C. U.
Days which may be a pretty good idea. Years ago we had no trouble
in handling those engineers, and we think we can still hold our own
for a day or two. A complete program will be carried in the May
issue of DICTA.
Memorial services for the late Mr. Justice Van Devanter were held
in the United States Supreme Court on Monday, March 16. Attorney
General Biddle presented resolutions to the court in memory of the
Justice.
Must Have Been Something'Serious
We are indebted to George Fischer of Brighton for pointing out
to us a rather unusual provision in the printed form of Notice to Non-
Resident of Probate of Will which has been in use for many years. It
was "Officially adopted by the County Judges' Association of Colo-
rado, March 18, 1904," so must be correct. Among other things, it
is stated in the form "that the said decedent was, at the time of his
disease, a resident of ... "
Enforcement Provision of the
Wage and Hour Act
By WALTER F. SCHERER*
As we have seen from Mr. Montgomery's comprehensive article,'
Sections 6 and 7 of. the Fair Labor Standards Act provide for minimum
wages and overtime compensation.
Violation of these provisions as well as others in the act is made
a criminal offense and in addition the Administrator is authorized
under Section 1 7 to institute injunction actions in the federal courts to
restrain such violations.
Further and more important than these actions, Section 16 (b) of
the act contains the following provisions creating a right of action and
providing a remedy for any employee affected by a violation of Section
6 or 7:
"Any employer who violates the provisions of Section 6 or
Section 7 of this act shall be liable to the employee or employees
affected in the amount of their unpaid minimum wages, or their
unpaid overtime compensation. as the case may be, and in an ad-
ditional equal amount as liquidated damages. Action to recover
such liability may be maintained in any court of competent jur's-
diction by any one or more employees for and in behalf of him-
self or themselves and other employees similarly situated, or such
employee or employees may designate an agent or representative
to maintain such action for and in behalf of all employees similarly
situated. The court in such action shall, in addition to any judg-
ment awarded to the plaintiff or plaintiffs, allow a reasonable at-
torney's fee to be paid by the defendant, and costs of the action."
As we know the constitutionality of the act as a whole was unan-
imously upheld in United States v. Darby Lumber Company,2 and
there seems to be no doubt as to the constitutionality of Section 1 6 (b).
I propose to consider briefly some of the questions arising under
this section of particular interest to attorneys prosecuting or defending
this type of action.
COVERAGE
At the risk of some repetition of what is contained in Mr. Mont-
gomery's article concerning coverage, it may be well to reiterate some
of the more prominent aspects as specifically directed to employee suits.
.*Of the Denver bar.
'Montgomery, Is Your Business Covered by the Wage-Hour Law? (1942) 19
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The first question that confronts the- attorney for the plaintiff, and
one of equal importance to defense counsel, is whether the plaintiff's
employment is within the coverage of the act. From a cursory exposi-
tion of the salient provisions of the act, it will be seen that coverage
under the act is based upon the view that the power of Congress over
interstate commerce extends not only to the regulation of the working
conditions of employees engaged in that commerce, but also to em-
ployees engaged in the production of goods for that commerce. Indeed,
most of the employees who now benefit from this law do so becaus?
they are "engaged in the production of goods for interstate commerce."
Section 3 (j) defines "produced" to mean
"produced, manufactured, mined, handled, or in any other manner
worked on in any state; and for the purposes of this act an em-
ployee shall be deemed to have been engaged in the production of
goods if such employee was employed in producing, manufactur-
ing, mining, handling, transporting, or in any other manner work-
ing on such goods, or in any process or occupation necessary to the
production thereof, in any state."
It is important then to know what interpretation the courts are
inclined to place upon this new principle. The older cases concerned
themselves with the "in commerce" concept and the courts generally
hold that production of goods, i.e., manufacture, mining, etc., even
though such goods were intended for shipment and were eventually
shipped beyond the confines of the producing state, was not in itself
interstate commerce, and therefore not within the regulatory power of
the Congress under the commerce clause. '  The leading example of
that narrow construction of the commerce clause is Hammer v. Dagen-
hart.4  However, recent decisions of the high court, culminating in the
Darby opinion, indicate a decided departure from that position, and ap-
proval of the broader view that Congress may, in the exercise of its
power over interstate commerce, regulate those productive processes and
activities that "have a substantial effect on [that] commerce or the
exercise of the Congressional power over it."
The Wage and Hour Division of the United States Department of
Labor has stated that:
"Employees are engaged in the production of goods 'for com-
merce' where the employer intends or hopes or has reason to believe
that the goods or any unsegregated part of them will move in
interstate commerce. * * * The facts at the time that the goods
are being produced determine whether an employee is engaged in
'United States v. Darby Lumber Co., supra, note 2. and cases cited therein.
4247 U. S. 251, 38 S. Ct. 422, 62 L. ed. 939 (1918).
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the production of goods for commerce and not any subsequent
act of his employer or of some third party."
And this interpretation has been approved by the Supreme Court.5
Except in a few instances, the act predicates coverage upon the
nature of the employee's duties rather than the nature of the employer's
business. The employer may be engaged in a purely intrastate activ-
ity, for example, the renting and maintenance of a loft building used
by tenants engaged in producing goods for interstate commerce; but
his maintenance employees may, nevertheless, be subject to the act be-
cause their activities are necessary to the production of goods for inter-
state commerce." It follows that an employee complaint that fails to
allege facts sufficient to show that the plaintiff is engaged in commerce
or in the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of the
act will be dismissed.
COURT OF COMPETENT JURISDICTION
It is now well established that an employee action tander Section
16 (b) of the act may be prosecuted in either the federal district courts
or in any state court whose jurisdiction under the laws of the state is
appropriate to the entertainment of such claims. The jurisdiction of
the federal district courts is not dependent upon the sum or value in
controversy or the citize.nship of the parties, since the action is one
arising under a law regulating interstate commerce. Nor are such
actions "suits for penalties and forfeitures incurred under the laws of
the United States" 7 so as to be without the jurisdiction of state courts.
REMOVAL FROM STATE TO FEDERAL COURTS
There have been three decisions by federal district courts on the
question of removal of employee actions under Section 16 (b) from
state courts to federal courts. In Ricciardi v. Lazzara Baking Corpora-
tion,s the court, while rejecting plaintiff's contention that such actions
were not subject to removal and stating that Section 16 (b) could not
be deemed to have qualified the Removal Act, granted the motion to
remand, upon the ground that the petition for removal bad not been
filed within the prescribed time.9 In Stewart v .Hichman,1° the motion
to remand was granted, there being no diversity of citizenship and the
court finding that no federal question was involved since "the statute
"United States v. Darby Lbr. Co.. supra note 2.
"Fleming v. Kirschbaum, 4 W.H.R. 171 (E.D. Pa. 1941).
7U.S.C.A. Tit. 28, §371.
832 F. Supp. 956 (D.N.J. 1940).
'U.S.C.A. Tit. 28. §72.
l4 W.H.R. 47 (W.D. Mo. 1941).
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is plain and simple no construction or interpretation is called for." The
opinion of District Judge Jones in Kuligowski et al. v. Hart" is to the
same effect. The complaint, filed in the state court, alleged that plain-
tiffs had not been paid overtime compensation as required by Section
7 of the Fair Labor Standards Act. The defendant removed the case
to the federal district court upon the ground that it "arises under the
* * * laws of the United States: * * * involves a substantial federal
question: and the sum in dispute exceeds the jurisdiction amount." On
motion by the plaintiff to remand, the court held:
"The case, as made in the plaintiff's petition, does not, as I
see it, involve more than fact questions; does not present a federal
question calling for a construction of the federal statute; nor is
it a cause, the decision of which depends upon the construction of
the federal statute under which the action was brought. Gully.
etc. v. First National Bank. 299 U. S. 109, 114.
"It would be a vain thing for Congress to provide that such
action as this could be maintained in any court of competent juris-
diction, only to permit the action so commenced to be removed to
the federal 'court.
Since all jurisdiction of the district courts arises cut of congres-
sional grant, so the Congress may modify or withdraw jurisdiction.
To the extent that it has given the right to employees to maintain
actions in other courts of competent jurisdiction, it seems reason-
able to conclude that it intended to give the employee the choice
of jurisdiction, not the employer."
APPLICABLE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
No time is specified in the act within which actions to recover back
wages must be instituted. While Section 971, Title 28 of the United
States Code provides a limitation of five years within which a suit or pro-
secution for "any penalty or forfeiture" accruing under the laws of the
United States must be commenced, as we have seen, an action for back
wages and the additional liability provided in Section 16 (b) of the
act is not such a suit. The Conformity Act' 2 requires that, in the
absence of a federal statutory provision to the contrary, the laws of the
several states shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common
law in the courts of the United States in cases where they apply. It
would seem then that under this provision the applicable state statute
of limitations will govern in all actions instituted under Section 16 (b)
"Decided by the northern district of Ohio on March 25, 1941, and unreported.2
LU.S.C.A. Tit. 28, §725.
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of the act, whether in state or federal courts. Also, the decision of the
Supreme Court in Erie Railroad Company v. Tompkins,2 indicates
that such corollary points as the time when the cause of action accrues,
etc., will be governed by the state courts' decisions under such applicable
statutes of limitations."
SURVIVAL OF ACTIONS
The general rule is that a cause of action given by a federal statute,
if no specific provision is made by act of Congress for its survival, sur-
vives or not according to the principles of the common law existing in
England at the time of the formation of the Union. And the Statute
of Edward III is regarded as a part of that common law. 15  Generally
rights of action based on contract survived at common law, while those
sounding in tort abated. However, even in tort actions, if the injury
giving rise to the right affected the property of the decedent, such actions,
by virtue of the Statute of Edward III, did not abate. It would seem
that the porion of the liability under Section 1 6 (b) for actual as dis-
tinguished from liquidated damages is founded upon contract. The
duty to pay arises out of the employment contract with the statute as
an operative provision of that contract.'- Hence there can be no ques-
tion of survival as to that portion of the liability.
But when consideration is given to the "additional equal amount"
provided in Section 16 (b), we have an action which, though contrac-
tual in form and substance, permits damages to be given .as for a wrong.
The question of survival of similar actions under the Anti-Trust Act1
7
has been before the courts. Section 1 5 of that statute provides for
triple damages to the party injured by a violation of that act. In
Sullivan v. Associated Bill Posters,'8 an action for triple damages under
the Anti-Trust Act was held to survive against the estate of the deceased
wrongdoer; and in Moore v. Backus,19 a similar action was held to sur-
vive in favor of the estate of the deceased plaintiff. The rule is ap-
parently the same where the "deceased party" is a dissolved corpora-
tion. 0  These cases proceed upon the theory that the action for triple
"304 U.S. 64, 58 S. Ct. 817, 82 L. ed. 1188, 114 A.L.R. 1487 (1938).
"See also Moore v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 312 U. S. 630, 61 S. Ct. 754, 85
L. ed. 1089 (1941).
'Moore v. Backus, 78 F. (2d) 571, 101 A.L.R. 379 (C.C.A. 7th, 1935).
cert. den. 296 U. S. 640, 56 S. Ct. 173, 80 L. ed. 455 (1935): United Copper
Securities Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 232 Fed. 574, 577 (C.C.A. 2nd, 1916).
"Cole v. Harker (W.D. Tenn.), decided October 10, 1939, and not officially
reported.
'7U.S.C.A. Tit. 15, § 1, et seq.
"36 F. (2d) 1000 (C.C.A. 2nd, 1925).
"Supra note 15.
-'Imperial Film Exch. v. General Film Co., 244 Fed. 985, 986 (S. D. N. Y.
1915).
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damages is an action for injury to the plaintiff's property as a result of
an illegal conspiracy; and that while such an action sounds in tort, it
survives and may be pursued against the estate of a deceased person
because the property or the proceeds or value of the property belonging
to the plaintiff have been appropriated by the deceased person and added
to his own estate or money. 21  This exception, as originally stated in
the Statute of Edward, covered only the death of the injured party.
However, judicial decisions have extended its application to cases where
the defendant wrongdoer is the deceased; provided always, that the
wrongful act resulted in both a decrease in the estate of the injured party
and an increase in that of the wrongdoer.
If then, the "additional equal amount" provided in Section 16 (b)
is merely an incident to the main liability for back wages and takes upon
itself the character of such main liability, it is contractual in nature and
will survive. If, on the other hand, recovery of the "additional equal
amount" be deemed to be separable and sounds in tort, it is believed
that, on the basis of the reasoning applied in the above cases under the
Anti-Trust Act, and action under Section 16(b) would also survive;
the estate of the deceased plaintiff-employee is decreased and that of the
deceased defendant-employer is correspondingly increased by the differ-
ence in money between what was actually paid and what might have
been found due under Section 16 (b).
PARTIES
Section 16(b) provides for three kinds of employee actions: an
action by the individual employee for himself only; an action by one
or more employees on behalf of himself or themselves and other em-
ployees "similarly situated"; and an action by an agent or representa-
tive of an individual employee or employees on behalf of all employees
'similarly situated." The first type of action presents no unusual
difficulties; the question of parties being governed by general principles
of law. The second and third type have occasioned several questions;
principally, the application of Rule 23 (a) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
Paragraph (a) (1) of Rule 23. As indicated by Professor
Moore22 this paragraph of the rule provides for "true class actions" as
the same were known at common law. The test of a joint or common
right is whether the owners of the right are so related that no one of
them could enforce the right, or his interest in the right, without the
compulsory joinder of all of the others. Under this test both the class
'Patton v. Brady, 184 U. S. 608, 615, 22 S. Ct. 493, 46 L. ed. 713 (1902);
United States v. Daniel, 6 How. 11, 12 L. ed. 323 (1848) ; Moore v. Backus, supra
note 15: Sullivan v. Associated Bill Posters, supra note 18.
22 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE, 2236.
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and the representative action provided by Section 16 (b) of the act are
clearly not true class actions. Normally the relationship of each em-
ployee to his employer results from a contract between the two, express
or implied, and such contract is unrelated, in the rights and duties thereby
created, to the contractual relations that might exist between the em-
ployer and his other employees. Any one employee could, at common
law, sue his employer for unpaid compensation without being com-
pelled to join all of his fellow employees in the action. There is nothing
in Section 16 (b) or in its legislative history to indicate that Congress
intended to change this situation and provide for the compulsory joinder
of employee claims under the act.
Paragraph (a) (2) of Rule 23. Since the class or representative
action under Section 16 (b) does not have for its object "the adjudica-
tion of the claims which do or may affect specific property involved in
the action," obviously Rule 23 (a) (2) has no application.
Paragraph (a) (3) of Rule 23. It follows that if the class or
representative action provided in Section 16 (b) of the act is to be
brought within the purview of Rule 23 (a) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, it must necessarily come within paragraph 3 of that
rule. While the rights of the individual employees may be several,
and common relief in the form of money damages may be sought, it is
by no means certain that in each case a common question of law or
fact affecting the several rights will be involved. Assuming, however.
that this latter qualification may also be satisfied, there would seem to
be no material advantage to be gained by attempting to bring such
actions within the limits of paragraph 3 of Rule 23. The judgment
rendered in actions under this paragraph of Rule 23 binds only those
parties actually before the court,'23 and recovery is limited to the plain-
tiff or plaintiffs named in the complaint and to such other employees
as intervene, or joins in the suit as plaintiff, or actually designate an
agent or representative to maintain the suit on their behalf. 24  As Pro-
fessor Moore points out:
"A person, who because of a common question of law or fact
may be said to be a member of a class on whose behalf or against
whom a spurious class suit (actions falling within Rule 23 (a) (3))
is pending, may either ignore the action or intervene 'and become a
party of record. Once having done the latter, however, he is a




"'Saxton v. Askew Co., 35 F. Supp. 519 (N.D.Ga. 19,40) Tedder v. Economy
Wholesale Grocery Co. (S.D. Fla.), decided January 30. 1941: Brooks v. Southern
Dairies, Inc., 4 W. H. R. 191 (S. D. Fla. 1941). But cf. Cissel v. The Great A.
U P. Co., 4 W. H. R. 135 (W.D. Ky. 1941).
'Supra note 22 at 2292.
90 DICTA
The class or representative action under Section 16 (b) is author-
ized by that section, and the additional authority provided in Rule 23
(a) (3) is not necessary.
When are employees "similarly situated" within the meaning of
Section 1 6 (b) ? In several cases instituted by former employees on be-
half of themselves and other employees of the defendant similarly situ-
ated, the defense has been made that the plaintiff, not being a present
employee of the defendant,. cannot be deemed to be similarly situated to
defendant's present employees. This contention has been consistently
overruled.2 16 In Clint v. Franklin Bargain House, Inc., 2 1 the. court re-
lied upon the opinion in Independent Transportation Company v.
Canton Insurance Office,28 and held that the word "employed," as used
in the definition of "employee" in Section 3 (e) of the act, "is a verb
of past and present tense," and that "it is obvious that one who had
worked and not been paid according to the act could bring the action
the same as if he were still employed." The court also overruled the
contention that "similarly situated" referred to defendant's other em-
ployees who are in the same class or in the same. department as the
plaintiff, and held that "taking the purpose of the act into considera-
tion" the term "similarly situated" means "all employees who have
not been paid according to the provisions of the act." "The act was
intended to and does link together all employees who are not paid ac-
cording to its provisions and as to them creates a question of common
interest. Each is given the right to have his claim presented in the
action of a fellow employe."
MANDATORY NATURE OF THE ADDITIONAL LIABILITY
ATTORNEY'S FEES, ETC.
In several decisions under Section 16 (b) it has been held that an
award of the "additional equal amount" plus attorney's fees and cost
is mandatory, and not dependent upon the willfulness of defendant's
violations. "-2 This view is supported by a comparison of Section 1 6 (b)
and Section 16 (a); the latter, providing criminal penalties, expressly
"'Tedder v. Economy Wholesale Grocery Co., supra note 24; Rakestraw v.
Miami Bottled Gas Co. (S.D. Fla.) decided January 30, 1941; Clint v. Franklin
Bargain House (Ct. of C. P., Lucas County, Ohio, No. 158,258, decided about
April 1, 1941).
"Supra note 26.
'173 Fed. 564 (W.D. Wash., 1909).
'Le Fevers v. General Export Iron Z6 Metal Co., 36 F. Supp. 838 (S.D. Tex.
1940) : Reeves v. Howard County Refining Co., 33 F. Supp. 90 (N.D. Tex. 1940);
Emerson v. Mary Lincoln Candies, 17 N.Y. Supp. (2d) 851 (1940); Eichorn v.
Kilkenny, 1940 Wage and Hour Manual 354 (Com. Pl., Passnic Co., N. J. 1939) ;
Floyd v. Dubois Soap Co., 4 W. H. R. 77 (Com. P1. Hamilton Co., Ohio) ; Abroe
v. t.insay. 4 W. H. R. 38 (Mun. Ct. Minneapolis, Minn. 1941).
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requires that the element of willfulness be established. Also the lan-
guage of Section 16 (b) uses the mandatory expression that the em-
ployer "shall be liable . . . in an additional -equal amount as liquidated
damages" and "the court .... shall . . . award . . . a reasonable at-
torney's fee ... and cost of the action" in the event judgment is awarded
to the plaintiff. That Section 16 (b), in providing for liquidated
damages, attorney's fees, and cost to the successful plaintiff, does not
contravene the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment seems to be
established both by analogy to the Anti-Trust Act, supra, and the de-
cisions of the Supreme Court upholding similar state enactments al-
leged to be violative of the due proccss clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.' 0
SECTION 16 (A)
Section 16 (a) of the act is as follows:
"Any person who wilfully violates any of the provisions of
Section 15 shall upon conviction thereof be subject to a fine of not
more than $10,000, or to imprisonment for not more than six
months, or both. No person shall be imprisoned under this sub-
section except for an offense committed after the conviction of
such person for a prior offense under this subsection."
It will be noted that the question of specific intent is material under
this subsection. As a matter of record the Wage and Hour Division
has only filed criminal charges in cases where the violations were flagrant,
chiefly the payment of sub-minimum wages, and where the defendant
has evidenced a wilful and deliberate attitude of defiance of the law.
The Division has filed a total of 190 cases; convictions were secured
in 145 cases while 3 defendants were acquitted. Fines imposed ranged
from $1.00 to the $10,000.00 maximum. As yet the Division has
not had occasion to file a second offense case and consequently no one
has as yet received a jail sentence.
INJUNCTION PROCEEDINGS
The Administrator is authorized under Section 17 to bring in the
federal courts an action for injunction to restrain violations of the act.
The statutory action entitled "An Act to Supplement Existing Laws
Against Unlawful Restraints and Monopolies and For Other Pur-
poses" ,'31 provides the procedure and the usual allegations of an ordinary
injunction action are included in the complaint. An added feature is
the inclusion in the prayer that the decree in addition to restraining
'Life U Casualty Co. v. McCray, 291 U. S. 566, 54 S. Ct. 482, 486, 78 L. ed.
987 (1934), and cases reviewed therein.
'U.S.C.A. Tit. 28, §381.
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future violations, restrain the shipment in interstate commerce of goods
produced in violation of the act.
Complaints of this nature have been filed in 2,523 cases, decrees
being entered in 2,512. In many instances where the employer has
voluntarily agreed to make restitution of back wages to his employees
and to comply with the act in the future, the Administrator has waived
the "hot goods" restraint allegation and the employer has been allowed
to ship his product without hindrance.
The courts have now, three years after the effective date of the
act passed upon almost every conceivable legal aspect and while the
several courts have often times arrived at different conclusions substan-
tial precedent now exists on most problems of legal interpretation. The
Division has maintained an excellent publicity service and is most
anxious to serve, not only the employee and his counsel but also the
employer, to the end that the principal objectives of the act, "the main-
tenance of minimum conditions necessary to the health, efficiency and
general well-being of workers" may be soon universally achieved.
Law School Enrollment Drops
Law school enrollment in Colorado has been vitally affected by
the war, and further drop in enrollment for the fall of 1942 is ex-
pected. "Speed-up" courses and courses on military law will not,
however, be offered by the law schools in this state.
Part of the decline in enrollment in law schools seems to be at-
tributed to causes other than the war. For the period 1938-1941 the
decrease in the number of law students in the United States was ap-
proximately 13,000, or 35 per cent of the total law school enrollment
in the United States.




University of Colorado 129 106 76
U niversity of D enver ------------------ --------- 78 67 56
Westminster University 85 73 67
Present enrollment in each of the three schools in the order named above
is 52, 33, and 55 students respectively. It is expected that these
present enrollments may drop by forty per cent by the fall term of 1942.
Right of Enemy Aliens and
Enemy Allies to Sue
BY WM. HEDGES, ROBINSON, JR.*
Since the case of Ex parte Don Ascanio Colonna,1 decided by the
United States Supreme Court on January 5, 1942, confusion seems to
exist as to the rights of enemy aliens to prosecute actions in courts in
this country. Much newspaper comment on this and subsequent de-
cisions of inferior courts has created many misconceptions regarding the
effect of this decision.
In the Colonna case, the Italian Ambassador sought permission to
file writs of prohibition and mandamus directed to a federal district
court upon the allegation that a vessel and its oil cargo, which were
the subject of litigation in the district court, belonged to the Italian
Government and were therefore entitled to the benefit of Italy's sovereign
immunity from suit. After the petition was filed, war between the
United States and Italy was declared. Section 7 (b) of the "Trading
with the Enemy Act ' '2 contains among other things, the following
provision: "Nothing in this act shall be deemed to authorize the prose-
cution of any suit or action at law or in equity in any court within the
United States by an enemy or ally of enemy prior to the end of the
war except as provided in Section ten hereof: Provided, however, that
an enemy or ally of enemy licensed to do business under this act may
prosecute and maintain any such suit or action so far as the same arises
solely out of the business transacted within the United States under
such licenses and so long as such license remains in full force and effect,
and provided further: That an enemy or ally of enemy may defend by
counsel any suit in equity or action at law which may be brought
against him."
In its opinion the court points out that the word "enemy" is de-
fined by the act to include the government of any nation with which
the United States is at war. It, therefore, declined to the plaintiff
the right to file or entertain the application since "war suspends the
right of enemy plaintiffs to prosecute actions in our courts."
In order, therefore, to understand what the court meant by "enemy
plaintiffs" reference must again be made to Section 2 of the act 3 for a
definition of the word "enemy." The act provides as follows: "That
*Of the Denver bar.
162 S. Ct. 373, 86 L. ed. 357 (1942).
240 Stat. 411, 50 U.S.C.A. Tit. 189.
350 U.S.C.A. Tit. 191, §2.
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the word enemy is deemed to mean (a) any individual or corporation
of any nationality resident within the territory or territory occupied
by any nation with which the United States is at war, or resident out-
side the United States and doing business in or being incorporated in
such territory; (b) the government of any nation with which the
United States is at war, or any political subdivision thereof, or any
officer, official agent or agency thereof and (c) such other individuals
as are natives, citizens, or subjects of any nation with which the United
States is at war wherever resident and wherever doing business (other
than citizens of this country) whom the President may by proclamation
designate as an enemy." The words "ally of enemy" are similarly
defined as they apply to allies of nations with which the United States
is at war. In other words, an enemy or ally of enemy to come within
the terms of the act, must be an enemy or enemy ally government or
its governmental agency, a non-resident alien enemy or ally, or a resi-
dent alien enemy or ally who is designated as such by the President.
Hence resident enemy aliens are not enemies within the meaning of the
act unless proclaimed as such by the President. To this date no such
proclamation has been issued. It should also be pointed out that no
restriction of any sort appears against enemy aliens to defend any suit
or action. If, however, their defense is in the nature of any affirmative
relief, then the provisions of the act may apply.
The confusion with which the Colonna case was first regarded is
illustrated by Kaufman u. Eisenberg,4 where the New York Court at
first ordered a tort action brought by a national of Germany stayed
until the end of the war. Thereafter on its own motion, the court
reversed itself stating that a different rule applies to cases dealing with
resident enemy aliens than to cases dealing with non-resident enemy
aliens. The court points out that a distinction was maintained at
common law between the rights of non-resident and resident enemy
aliens. The statute preserved this distinction and in addition gives to
licensed enemy aliens the status of an "alien friend."
The court draws two conclusions. First, since the act is not of
omnibus application and affects only the class or type of enemy alien
therein proscribed, the resident enemy alien has a right to sue or
prosecute in our courts until such right has been withdrawn by manifest
legislative intention or presidential pronouncement. Second, the act
is not intended to apply to non-commercial intercourse and since the
instant suit was in tort, the status of the plaintiff was immaterial.
Prior to the Kaufman case, the federal district court in Pennsyl-
vania on November 18, 1941, decided in the case of Verano v. De
Angelis Coal Company,5 that since no formal declaration of war ex-
'32 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 450 (1942).
-41 F. Supp. 954 (1941).
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isted at that date between Italy and the United States, a motion to stay
a damage action on the ground that the plaintiff was a national of
Italy and an undeclared state of war then existed between the United
States and Italy, would be denied. It is not necessary that a formal
declaration of war exists, the court stated, referring to Hamilton v.
McClaughay,6 but a "condition of war" which is recognized by the
proper political department is sufficient. The court was careful to
state that if the plaintiff in that action should recover, and it "then
appears to the court that a condition of war does exist between the two
countries, appropriate action will be taken by the court on the basis of
the facts and circumstances then existing." However, it should be
pointed out that Section 2 of the Trading with the Enemy Act ex-
pressly defines the beginning of the war as "midnight ending the day
on which Congress has declared or shall declare war or the existence of
a state of war." It would seem, therefore, that the limitations im-
posed by the act only apply when there has been an actual declaration
of war by Congress; but this does not mean that limitations imposed
on enemy aliens by common law may not be called into being in either
situation.
The final decision appearing under the present re-enactment of
the Trading with the Enemy Act is that of the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts. In the case of Cappellote v. General Wool Com-
pany,' the defendant's motion for a stay on the grounds that the plain-
tiff was an enemy alien was denied since the action sounded in tort and
the plaintiff was a resident of the United States. Cases interpreting
the act during the last war are of the same general trend. There is no
doubt that the President may enlarge the definition of the term "enemy"
but until he does it would seem that resident enemy aliens have free
access to our courts.8
6136 Fed. 445 (1905).
'Case No. 42587, decided Feb. 18, 1942.
'See statement of Attorney General Biddle under date of Jan. 31, 1942.
As Soon Come My Chake
Ray Moses of Alamosa sends us the following letter which was
received in response to a request for payment of a delinquent account.
Antonito Colo Feb. 10 1942
Dear Friend I have a letter From you in what you say you Cant
go so Far in my Count. Dont get so toff. I Start in my Job the third
of this Month. As Soon Come my Chake I take Care in my Count.
I Expect they Come Before the TWenty of this mount. You Know
my Friend I was sow tight I cant send you all the amount But you wait
for your money as soon they Come I send Some Money.
Your Verry Truley JOE C
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Judicial Vilification of a Blameless Juror
BY FRANK SWANCARA*
There are legal remedies against the private malefactor who com-
mits an injury by libel or slander, but when judicial fangs make
poisonous thrusts the victim has no relief and a protest might be con-
tempt. This is "sound public policy."' A judge was safe in saying
to a lady witness: ". . . the place you are operating down there is such
a dirty, low-down, and disorderly place .. .-2
All this is freshman knowledge, but who would expect an unpro-
voked judicial aspersion against the character of one juror who had acted
exactly as his eleven associates?
Mr. Neild was a venireman in a homicide case, and was sworn in
as a juror without objection or challenge. He was well known, previ-
ously having "been a candidate for county trustee, a circumstance well
known to elicit and give publicity to every flaw and defect of char-
acter."-3  He voted "guilty." So did all his associates in the box. The
appellate court said the "evidence ... establishes a clear case of murder,"
and one judge said it was "a case of clear and aggravated murder. ' ' 4
The motion for new trial was "upon the ground that (Mr. Neild)
one of the traverse jury was an atheist." This juror, because he served
as such, was put upon trial. The defenders of the killer, for the
killer's sake, became the prosecutors of the juror, and depended on the
testimony of the Reverend Sirr. He testified that once "for the good of
Neild" he talked with him, and that ". . . Neild did not in terms deny
that there was a God, but from what he said, he (Rev. Sirr) took up
the belief that he (Neild) was an atheist .. -5 The juror was de-
fended by the witness Mason, who "said that he would have confidence
in his honesty and integrity."6
On review, Judge Peck held that "the evidence is full upon the
point" that Mr. Neild was "an atheist," and said: "By our constitu-
tion such a person could not hold a civil office; . . . Why, it may be
asked. It is answered, because he cannot take an oath-he cannot be
trusted."
If in Russia the tables were turned, and the "constitution" were
to disqualify non-atheists to be witnesses or jurors, on the pretext that
*Of the Denver bar.
'Note, L.R.A. 1915E 1051.
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they "cannot be trusted," it is easy to guess what would be said about
it. The Tennessee constitution, to which Judge Peck referred, has
this clause:
"No person who denies the being of a God, or a future state of
rewards and punishments, shall hold any office in the civil department
of this state."
It would not be difficult to make up a list of eminent men. who
could not be Tennessee jurors, if residing in that state, because of private
denial of, or non-belief in, "a future state of punishments."
Judge Peck said that "the constitution has pointed her artillery
against" atheists. True, but the "artillery" aims against non-believers
in "a future state of punishments" also. The judge in question ex-
hibited no regret for his judicial conclusions. Evidently he rejoiced,
for like Brutus, not satisfied with one stab, he added:
"This person called as a juror had no moral capacity to be bound
by the obligation of an oath .... He was an evil genius, in a sacred
place."
Larimer County Bar Meets
The Larimer County Bar Association met at Fort Collins, March 3
to hold its annual meeting and elect officers. Winton M. Ault of Fort
Collins was selected president; Hatfield Chilson of Loveland, vice-
president, and Jerome Smith of Fort Collins, secretary-treasurer. The
first member of the Larimer County association to be called to the army
was Robert McCreary of Loveland, who was presented by the associa-
tion with an engraved rabbit's foot.
Tough Break
Among the defendants charged with violating the Volstead act
were a husband and wife, both Italians. The wife insisted that she
alone was guilty and that her husband, who had suffered other con-
victions of like nature, was innocent. The husband pleaded not guilty,
and since the evidence against the husband was very weak, Judge Symes
discharged the husband, and sentenced the wife to thirty days in jail.
As soon as the court adjourned, the husband was out in the ball
cursing Judge Symes. One of the district attorneys went over to the
man and told him that he had better cease, and moreover the fellow
should feel lucky that the judge had not given his wife a stiffer sentence.
"That's just the trouble!" complained the man bitterly. "I
had it all fixed up with my sweetie to come up to the house while my
wife was in jail. And that... judge only sentenced her to thirty days!"
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American Bar Reports on Income Tax Amend-
ment to Avoid Accrual Method
in Death Cases*
It cannot be doubted that the decisions in the case of Helvering v.
Enright,, and Pfaff v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,2 if left un-
limited by legislation, will result in great hardships upon the depend-
ents of lawyers, doctors and other professional men, and of all taxpayers
whose income consists largely of compensation for personal services not
immediately paid for. Section 42 of the Internal Revenue Code re-
quires that upon the death of taxpayers who have made Federal income
tax returns on the basis of cash receipts (which is the basis used by
nearly all individuals), the return for the year in which death ocurs
shall include "accrued" income as well. The result of the Supreme
Court decisions above cited is that all uncollected and even undetermined
compensation for personal services is to be included, it a valuation fixed
(subject to review) by the Treasury Department.
While the two cases cited happened to involve the estates of mem-
bers of partnerships, and certain specific objections to the tax were based
upon partnership sections of the Internal Revenue Code, the results are
by no means limited to members of partnerships but are fully applicable
to lawyers practicing as individuals. Numerous decisions of the lower
courts and Board of Tax Appeals since the Enright and Pfaff opinions
were handed down, show the lengths to which the doctrine of those
cases will be carried. In Estate of Geo. W. Wickersham' (former U. S.
Attorney General and member of Cadwallader, Wickersham Zd Taft),
the "accrued" additional items upon which income taxes were assessed
included more than $78,000, "in connection with which no agreement
with the client as to the amount of compensation existed at the time
of decedent's death, and no other facts existed at that time from which
it was possible to ascertain definitely the amount of the fee which
would be charged or collected."
In Estate of Lewis Cass Ledyard, Jr.4 (member of Carter, Ledyard
f' Milburn), the additional assessment of tax by the Commissioner was
more than $300,000, although this was reduced somewhat by the Board,
which allowed credit for a liability which was undetermined at the time
of death.
*Article prepared by Frank M. Cobourn of Toledo, member of the firm of
Welles, Kelsey, Cobourn f3 Harrington, under the auspices of the Taxation Section of
the American Bar Association.
1312 U. S. 636. 61 S. Ct. 777, 85 L. ed. 1093 (1941).
2312 U. S. 646, 61 S. Ct. 783, 85 L. ed. 1099 (1941).
'44 B. T. A. 619.
444 B. T. A. 1056.
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A computation of the additional income tax liability upon the
estate of a lawyer dying November 1, 1941, with an annual net income
of $30,000 ($25,000 for the 10-months' period) and having uncol-
lected and undetermined fees amounting to $45,000, shows additional
income tax on the $45,000 which was not actually received, of nearly
$26,000. When it is realized that the fees for such services are un-
determined and uncollected and that there may be very considerable
uncertainty and delay on both counts, and that the determination by
the Treasury Department is likely to be at least a reasonably generous
valuation, the extent of the hardship is apparent.
Even in cases involving much smaller amounts, the liability is
likely to be unreasonably high, and the requirement of arranging for
cash payment may make necessary the sale of other assets of the estate
at a sacrifice. For example, with an annual income of $6,000 ($5,000
for the 10 months) and uncollected fees valued at $10,000, the ad-
ditional income tax on the amount not actually received is about $2,360.
A great many lawyers, recognizing the severe and seemingly unfair
tax burdens resulting from this situation, and believing that Congress
never intended that Section 42 (which was adopted in its present form
in the 1934 law) should be so interpreted, have written to the Treas-
ury Department and to members of the House Ways and Means Com-
mittee and Senate Finance Committee, seeking some reasonable relief
by amendment of the section. As a result of the report of its Federal
Income Tax Committee and other memoranda and correspondence on
the subject, the Tax Section of the American Bar Association, at its
meeting in Indianapolis early in October, 1941, unanimously recom-
mended an amendment as follows:
"Sec. 42. Period in Which Items of Gross Income Included. The
amount of all items of gross income shall be included in the gross income
for the taxable year in which received by the taxpayer, unless, under
methods of accounting permitted under section 41, any such amounts
are to be properly accounted for as of a different period. In the case of
the death of a taxpayer there shall be included in computing net income
for the taxable period in which falls the date of his death, amounts
(other than undetermined amounts for personal services) accrued up
to the date of his death if not otherwise properly includable in respect
of such period or a prior period."
The change from the present law consists of the insertion of the
parenthetical clause which appears in italics. The explanation made
in the American Bar Association Tax Section's report reads as follows:
"The above Resolution proposes a change in Section 42 of the
Internal Revenue Code which, in its present form requires the inclusion
in the last income tax return of a decedent of amounts of income 'ac-
crued' up to the date of his death. This provision has been interpreted
so as to expand the concept of accrual to include items which are unas-
certained and uncertain in amount and which the decedent's estate may
never become entitled to receive. As a result large amounts of income
are being taxed in the last return of a decedent at a time before the
executors have received the money with which to pay the tax and be-
fore it is determined that the estate will ever receive the money. The
situation is particularly aggravating in cases where the income of a
decedent is income from professional personal services, such as attorneys'
fees, doctors' fees, etc. The proposed Resolution recommends that un-
determined amounts for personal services be excluded from the last return
of a decedent."
This recommendation, as part of the Taxation Section's report,
was approved and recommended by the House of Delegates on behalf
of the American Bar Association. At the meeting of the Ohio State
Bar Association in Toledo October 23rd last, the Taxation Section by
the unanimous vote of those present approved the amendment as previ-
ously recommended by the American Bar Association, and this action
has now been approved by the officers and Executive Committee of the
Ohio State Bar Association. It is submitted for the consideration of
Ohio lawyers with the suggestion that those approving it do what they
can to influence officials of the Treasury Department, Representatives
and Senators to approve and enact this amendment or similar remedial
legislation.
Other forms of amendments have been submitted and several were
carefully considered by members of the Tax Section of the American
Bar Association, but the one which was approved, as above set forth,
seemed most desirable because of its simplicity and the fact that prac-
tically all it undertakes to do is to revise the concept of accrued income
within limits which probably go as far as Congress intended when Sec-
tion 42 was changed to its present form. The amendment in no way
changes or interferes with the basic purpose of that section, which is
that all actually accrued income should be subject to tax at some proper
time, but merely eliminates from tax as not being "accrued," certain
items which have never been looked upon as income, and as a practical
matter are not such prior to or at the time of decedent's death.
Denver Bar Association to Hear Address
on Price Control Act of 1942
The next regular monthly meeting of the Denver Bar Association
will be held on April 6 at 12:15 p. m. in the Chamber of Commerce
dining room. The principal address will be given by John A. Carroll,
Regional Attorney for the Office of Price Administration, on the sub-
ject, "Legal History and Analysis of the Emergency Price Control Act
of 1942."
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The Unfortunate Fate of the
Peroxide Blond
By IVOR 0. WINGREN*
The advocate of the story-book and play is a master of cross-
examination. Always he slowly, methodically and unmercifully en-
tangles the witness in a maze of actual or apparent contradictions.
Laymen are impressed by his skill, and many lawyers are forced to
yield him their admiration. Even more they are forced to envy his in-
varying success. But as every trial practitioner knows, the hot breath
of cross-examination, if carried too far, may produce an explosive back-
fire, equally fatal to the equanimity of the cross-examiner and the cause
of his client. And such was the unhappy experience of the unfortunate
Mr. McCoy.
Harry McCoy had been making money, but according to the
government, his product was not the "real McCoy." As the trial
opened and he sat at the table with his youthful counsel, he presented
a strange sight indeed. He was a large man, tall and well built. His
face was adorned with glasses and a long black mustache. But the
most startling feature about him was his abundant golden-yellow hair.
Harry was a graduate of the Wyoming state penitentiary at
Rawlins where he had studied the art of counterfeiting, and under
some very capable teachers, too. The one weakness of the course, though,
was that it was necessarily theoretical. Laboratory work was not per-
mitted. But when Harry was discharged from the penitentiary, he
sought to remove this deficiency. He immediately moved in with his
brother Leonard in Denver, and the two decided to put into practical
application the education which Harry had so recently acquired.
At that time one of the larger dealers in chemicals maintained its
sales office within half a block of the Post Office Building. And the Post
Office Building housed not only the post office, but also the office of
Mr. Rowland K. Goddard, United States Secret Service Supervising
Agent. Goddard had developed, and still possesses, a strong aversion,
amounting' almost to an obsession, against counterfeiters. But along
with his obsession, he bad developed an idea. He reasoned that it might
be easier to trace the materials as they went into the counterfeiter's
plant than to trace the counterfeiter's products back to his plant. And
so he made an arrangement with his neighbor the chemical dealer.
*Of the Denver bar and Assistant United States Attorney.
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The dealer sold a wide variety of chemicals, and it was not un-
common for customers to inquire as to the effects of different chemicals
on various materials. But the clerks were shrewd and could usually
sense whether the customer was an honest citizen, intent only on the
most effective use of his purchase in a legitimate enterprise, or whether
he was seeking information for an unlawful purpose. They were
particularly vigilant when confronted by soft spoken inquiries con-
cerning the effect of certain chemicals on copper plates, and even more
so when the inquiry was followed by an order for those chemicals.
In those cases the desired chemical was always in the farthermost corner
of the basement and a considerable time was consumed in securing and
preparing the order. In the meantime the clerk would telephone God-
dard of his suspicions and allow sufficient time for Goddard or one of
his men to come up the alley, enter the salesroom from the rear and have
a good look at the customer. Then if all went well, when the cus-
tomer reached his home or plant, Goddard's man would be not far
behind.
Harry McCoy had studied diligently his course in counterfeiting,
but he had not learned to demean himself as an honest man. And be-
cause of that, when he finally secured his purchase, stepped out of the
salesroom of the chemical dealer and walked to his home, Goddard's
man watched him every step of the way. Likewise a close acquaintance
of Mr. Goddard's was not far away when Harry purchased green ink
at one place, a printing press at another and, at still another, copper
plates of the variety used by engravers.
Goddard waited until he felt that the business had progressed
far enough, and then, with a proper search warrant, he and his agents
searched the McCoy residence and found, not only a complete counter-
feiting plant, but also counterfeit bills in all stages of manufacture.
Some were completely finished and ready for passing. They also found
Leonard McCoy, but Harry was nowhere to be found. He had taken
a trip and was out of town. Leonard was arrested, promptly pleaded
guilty and told the whole story.
That was in the spring, and Harry was not apprehended until
a few days after the court recessed from jury trials for the summer.
Because he had not been caught red-handed, and because he was more
experienced in the ways of crime than his brother, he decided to plead
not guilty and take his chances with a jury. He was unable to provide
bond so was sent to jail for the summer.
At that time both the warden of the jail and the United States
marshal had one thing in common. Both thoroughly enjoyed a prac-
tical joke. One might suspect that even the occasional acquittal of an
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accused was, to them, perhaps not too great a price to pay for the fun
which they created for themselves.
The case came on for trial in September. The defendant had no
money, not even any that he had made himself, with which to employ
an attorney, so in accordance with the prevailing custom, one of the
younger members of the federal bar was appointed to defend him. The
government's case was in the hands of the Assistant United States
Attorney.
Harry McCoy was brought in by the marshal and seated at the
table of his youthful counsel. As the marshal turned to leave, he
grinned at the Assistant United States Attorney.
"Harry McCoy has got a surprise for you." That was all he said.
One of the government's principal witnesses was the clerk for the
chemical dealer. He testified concerning the chemicals purchased by the
accused and the inquiries which the accused had made at the time. He
also testified that the man sitting at the table with the counsel for the
defendant was the same man who had made the purchase and inquiries.
Counsel for the defendant lost no time in his cross-examination.
"Did the man who bought these materials from you wear glasses?"
"No."
"Did he have yellow hair?"
"No."
"Did he wear a mustache?"
"No."
The prosecutor was visibly disturbed. This was serious. Was
this the surprise the marshal had told him about? He began to think
of the witnesses he would have to call to prove the changes that McCoy
had made in his appearance.
The young defense counsel rushed in for the kill. "How, then-,"
and he swept his arm majestically toward the accused. "How, then,
can you say that this man purchased those materials?"
A hush came over the court room as the witness looked calmly
at the accused.
"See those ears? I could never forget those ears!"
With one accord every person in the court room looked at the de-
fendant's ears and burst into laughter. They were enormous. Few
had ever seen ears so large.
It was then disclosed that the defendant had grown the long
black mustache during the summer he had spent in jail and that during
the same time the marshal and warden had permitted him to obtain
peroxide with which to bleach his hair.
Oh, yes, the verdict. Guilty. It took the jury fifteen minutes.
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Nolo Contendere?
One of the most delightful books about lawyers is the auto-
biography of John C. Knox, A Judge Comes of Age. In it he relates
many of his experiences on the bench. One of the most interesting
stories concerns the cross-examination of a "rotund, cherubic, soft-
voiced and lisping" Negro who was testifying against his former com-
panions in a mass bootlegging trial. After a series of vilifying and
brow-beating questions directed to this witness, by one of defense coun-
sel, each of which boomeranged, "the attorney," recounts Judge Knox,
"certain now that he had as yet failed to create the impression before
the jury for which he had hoped, decided to make one more effort. It
seemed to me that I saw certain signs of desperation. The lawyer
pointed dramatically at the Negro.
" 'For what else have you been arrested?' he demanded.
" 'Well, suh,' came the soft reply, 'theah's nothin' Ah kin recollect.'
" 'Do you mean that?' shouted the lawyer.
" 'Yes, sub. Ah means whateveh Ah says, suh:'
"With a solemn manner and a deep voice the lawyer offered another
question.
" 'Do you mean to tell this court and jury that you were not ar-
rested for rape?'
" 'Oh, yes, sub,' he smiled. 'Ah clean forgot 'bout dat. It jes'
slipped mah mind.'
" 'And what did you get for that?' shrieked the lawyer.
"I listened intently for the answer, and so, I am sure, did every
juror. Yet the Negro's manner did not change an iota, and his voice,
if anything, grew still softer.
'Married,' he replied."
Mesa County Bar Acts on Important Matters
The Mesa. County Bar Association met in February to form plans
whereby a committee on standards for title options would be formed.
The tentative plans formulated by the association contemplate that
the procedure will be on lines similar to that used by the Denver com-
mittee. The association also is directing the purchase of the county
law library which was established at Grand Junction a number of
months ago under the authority of recently enacted legislation. Plans
have been made to purchase about 1400 volumes of the Reporter System
as a start for the county library.
At its annual meeting the Association elected Cecil S. Haynie
president and Lincoln D. Coit secretary for the coming year.
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